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a b s t r a c t
Credit borrower concentration arises when a bank or ﬁnancial institution lends a large amount of its
funds to a few large borrowers. We ﬁnd that borrower concentration is positively related to non-perform-
ing loans and negatively related to ﬁnancial performance. We also ﬁnd that the voting power of bank’s
controlling shareholder is positively related to the borrower concentration. The evidence is consistent
with the view that controlling shareholders divert resources away from banks by extending a high vol-
ume of loans to a few related parties, which leads to high borrower concentration. Further evidence indi-
cates that some seemingly unrelated large borrowers, as reported in the ﬁnancial disclosure, are actually
related to the controlling shareholders. We also provide evidence that going public mitigates the tunnel-
ing activities of controlling shareholders.
 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Credit borrower concentration arises when a bank or ﬁnancial
institution lends a large amount of its funds to a few large borrow-
ers. Although concentration of borrowers is considered by global
banking regulators as an important threat to the safety of banks,
and regulations have been established to constrain its possible
adverse effects,1 the academic literature has devoted little attention
to this issue. A few studies examine loan concentration across sec-
tors or regions (for example Acharya et al., 2006; Berger et al.,
2010), but credit concentration across large borrowers has not been
thoroughly investigated.
In this paper, we use a sample of Chinese commercial banks to
examine the determinants and consequences of credit concentra-
tion across large borrowers. Borrower concentration is generally
high in China. For example, during our sample period from 2006
to 2011, the loan to the largest borrower represents on average
21.7% of bank’s net capital, and the loans to the largest ten borrow-
ers total on average 88.2% of bank’s net capital. These ﬁgures are
signiﬁcantly higher than the large exposure limits speciﬁed by
the Commercial Bank Law or the banking regulator, suggesting that
commercial banks in China bear a substantial credit risk due to
borrower concentration.2 The foregoing ﬁgures also suggest that
some banks have a strong motivation to maintain a high degree of
borrower concentration.
Our empirical tests indicate that the degree of borrower con-
centration is signiﬁcantly positively associated with non-perform-
ing loans, and signiﬁcantly negatively associated with operating
performance. We also ﬁnd that when the ownership percentage
of the largest shareholder is high, or when the ownership gap
between the largest shareholder and other blockholders is high,
borrower concentration is high. This evidence is consistent with
the tunneling view: controlling shareholders divert resources away
from banks by extending a high volume of loans to a few related
parties, which leads to a high degree of borrower concentration
and is detrimental to banks’ interests.
We further conduct a series of tests to corroborate our results.
First, we ﬁnd that although the correlation between related loans
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankﬁn.2015.01.011
0378-4266/ 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
⇑ Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: traopingui@jnu.edu.cn (P. Rao), yueheng@gsm.pku.edu.cn (H.
Yue), zhujigao@uibe.edu.cn (J. Zhu).
1 The Basel Committee regarded credit concentration as the cause of a ‘‘signiﬁcant
proportion of major bank failures’’, of which credit borrower concentration is an
important type. See ‘‘Measuring and Controlling Large Credit Exposures’’, Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision, Basel, 1991.
2 As explained later, enforcement of the law with respect to loan concentration has
not been effective.
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as reported in the bank’s ﬁnancial statements and borrower con-
centration is signiﬁcantly positive, the reported related loans are
signiﬁcantly smaller than the loans to the top 10 borrowers. More-
over, when we carefully examine the detailed information on large
borrowers, we ﬁnd that many large borrowers, although not being
identiﬁed as related in the ﬁnancial reports, are actually related
parties of large shareholders. Taken together, the evidence sug-
gests that banks may intentionally avoid reporting related lending
because related lending is subject to strict scrutiny. Second, we
ﬁnd that borrower concentration has incremental explanatory
power in explaining non-performing loans and operating perfor-
mance, even after controlling for reported related lending activ-
ities. The evidence suggests that borrower concentration could be
used as a better indicator of tunneling than reported related lend-
ing. Third, we provide evidence that stock market listing mitigates
borrower concentration, perhaps due to enhanced governance
mechanisms.
Our paper contributes to the literature in the following aspects.
First, although the importance of borrower concentration risk has
been well recognized among regulators, there are few studies on
this issue. We utilize hand-collected data and thoroughly examine
the determinants and consequences of borrower concentration. In
support of the tunneling view, our ﬁndings enhance our under-
standing of borrower concentration and contribute to future
monitoring of relevant risk. Alerted by the ﬁnancial crisis of
2008, many countries intend to impose stricter limits on borrower
concentration. For example, the proposal by the Federal Reserve of
the United States to extend the single borrower limit to ﬁnancial
groups3 met resistance from banks. Japanese regulators have made
a similar proposal.4 Our ﬁndings support these proposals by showing
that a high degree of borrower concentration is associated with high
default risk and low ﬁnancial performance.
Second, the literature has found that controlling shareholders
use related lending as a channel to divert resources from minor-
ity shareholders and depositors (La Porta et al., 2003; Laeven,
2001). This related lending is detrimental to banks and distorts
the capital allocation process. However, when monitoring related
lending, it is often difﬁcult to identify related parties. Moreover,
banks could intentionally structure loans to avoid reporting
related lending. Our paper ﬁnds evidence that some seemingly
unrelated large borrowers are, in fact, related to controlling
shareholders. Our results indicate that borrower concentration
can serve as a simple proxy for tunneling, suggesting that close
monitoring of borrower concentration may contribute to investor
protection.
Third, though Allen et al. (2005) suggest that informal ﬁnancing
is important in China, Ayyagari et al. (2010) ﬁnd that the formal
banking system contributes to the fast growth of China’s economy.
Our study examines how banks allocate credit across borrowers
and the associated economic consequence. Our paper contributes
to the understanding of the banking system in China, the largest
emerging market.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
provides background information on China’s banking system and
a review of prior research. Section 3 discusses our sample and
descriptive statistics. Section 4 presents our main empirical ana-
lyses of the determinants and economic consequences of borrower
concentration. Section 5 includes additional tests. Section 6
concludes.
2. Institutional background and prior literature
2.1. Lending limits to large borrowers
The safety of the banking system is important for the modern
economy. Bank regulators worldwide have designed an increasing-
ly complex system to control risk (i.e., Basel I, II and III). Among the
variety of risks under consideration, the large credit exposure of a
bank to an individual borrower, or a group of related borrowers, is
signiﬁcant. If a creditor with large loans experienced ﬁnancial dif-
ﬁculties, the bank would incur signiﬁcant ﬁnancial losses or even
failure. The Asian ﬁnancial crisis (1997–1998) and the failure of
large companies (such as Enron) have illustrated the danger of a
high degree of credit concentration.
To control the risk of credit concentration, regulators have
established policies on lending limits or large exposure, which
set a maximum share of a bank’s capital that can be lent to a single
borrower or a group of related borrowers.5 For example, lending
limits on loans to a single borrower have been an integral part of
United States bank regulation since its inception in 1863. The lend-
ing limit for a single borrower was initially set at 10% of net capital
and was subsequently changed to 15%.6 In the United Kingdom, large
exposure limits were introduced in 1984, as a result of the rescue of
Johnson Matthey Bankers (JMB), and these rules were subsequently
adopted by banking regulators in the European Union. According to
Morris (2001), most countries have similar lending limits.7 In Jan-
uary 1991, the Basel Committee issued an article titled ‘‘Measuring
and Controlling Large Credit Exposures’’, which discusses the impor-
tant issues in measuring and controlling large credit exposures. The
paper clearly indicates that a ‘‘signiﬁcant proportion of major bank
failures have been due to credit risk concentration of one kind or
another’’ and ‘‘it is important for supervisors to consider measures
limiting banks’ exposures to concentrated forms of credit risk in gen-
eral and large borrowers in particular’’.
Although regulators realize the importance of controlling con-
centration risk, especially borrower concentration, academic works
seem to focus exclusively on industry or sector concentration. For
example, theoretical models of intermediation (see Diamond,
1984; Ramakrishnan and Thakor, 1984) suggest that credit diversi-
ﬁcation into new sectors makes it less expensive for banks to
achieve credibility in their role as screeners and reduces the banks’
probability of default. Empirical works do not provide clear sup-
port for related theoretical arguments. Acharya et al. (2006) exam-
ine the effect on return and risk of credit diversiﬁcation in
industries and sectors. Using a sample of 105 Italian banks, the
authors ﬁnd that diversiﬁcation does not produce superior perfor-
mance or greater safety for banks. The authors suggest that con-
centrated banks can enjoy the beneﬁts of expertise in the
industries in which they concentrate while there are diseconomies
of diversiﬁcation for a bank that expands into industries in which it
faces a high degree of competition or lacks prior lending experi-
ence. Similarly, Berger et al. (2010) and Tabak et al. (2011) ﬁnd that
loan portfolio concentration increases bank performance and
reduces default rates. These papers all examine loan concentration
in industries (or sectors) and do not examine loan concentration
across large borrowers.
3 ‘‘Banks urge Fed retreat on credit exposure’’, By Tom Braithwaite, Financial Times,
Aug 15, 2012.
4 ‘‘Japan’s FSA plans tougher lending limits on banks: Nikkei’’, Reuters, Oct 16,
2012.
5 The usual regulations in Basel I and II focus on risk-adjusted capital requirements.
The limit of large exposure represents a direct limit on banks’ risk taking (Schooner
and Taylor, 2010).
6 An additional 10% is allowed if the loan is totally secured by readily marketable
collateral.
7 The only two exceptions that have no lending limits are Australia and New
Zealand. However, these countries have other measures to control credit concentra-
tion risk.
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Although both industry and borrower concentration are related
to the concept of loan diversiﬁcation, they are signiﬁcantly differ-
ent. First, banks with a high degree of industry concentration
may not have a high degree of borrower concentration. This is
because an industry may have a large number of ﬁrms and banks
have sufﬁcient choices to diversify borrowers within the industry.
Second, when banks focus on a few industries, they bear the rele-
vant industry risks. However, when banks lend loans to a few large
borrowers, they bear the risks associated with these large borrow-
ers. The risk that an industry as a whole will experience ﬁnancial
difﬁculties is generally much lower than is the case for an indi-
vidual borrower. This makes industry concentration a less risky
choice than borrower concentration. Third, when a bank focuses
on one industry, it can obtain industry expertise and apply it to
other companies in the same industry. However, when a bank
focuses on a few large borrowers, it can only obtain related infor-
mation for the speciﬁc borrowers. Such information may not apply
to other borrowers. Fourth, as La Porta et al. (2003) indicate, large
borrowers are typically related parties of the large shareholders of
the lending bank. The researchers also indicate that large share-
holders can employ related lending to expropriate the interests
of minority shareholders. There are no similar concerns regarding
expropriation related to industry concentration. Because of the
above difference and the lack of research on borrower concentra-
tion, we believe an investigation of borrower concentration is
warranted.
2.2. The institutional background of China
China’s economy has grown rapidly in the past 30 years and it
has become the second largest in the world. The ﬁnancial assets
of the banking sector represented approximately 250% of China’s
GDP in 2012, indicating the importance of the sector to China’s
economy. Prior to 1978, China had a planned economy in which
all banks were controlled by the state and acted within a single
administrative hierarchy (Lin and Zhang, 2009). Since 1978 (and
especially after 1998), the government has substantially reformed
the banking system. Except for three policy banks, banks have been
restructured as proﬁt-oriented entities. Private or even foreign
investors have been introduced into the banks’ ownership struc-
tures. Presently, China has over 160 commercial banks, including
the four largest state-owned banks.8 Sixteen commercial banks
have undertaken IPOs and are listed on the stock market.
Similar to other countries, China’s regulators have recognized
the risk of borrower concentration. In ‘‘China’s Law of Commercial
Banks’’ issued in 1995 and a regulation released by the People’s
Bank of China (PBC hereafter) and the China Banking Regulatory
Commission (CBRC hereafter) in 1996, there is an explicit limit
on large exposure. The largest loan to a single borrower cannot
exceed 10% of net capital, the largest loan to a company group can-
not exceed 15% of net capital, and the largest ten loans cannot
exceed 50% of net capital.9 Although regulators have issued regula-
tions on large exposure, many banks have loan concentration
exceeding the speciﬁed limits. (Many media reports on loan concen-
tration can be found in ﬁnancial websites, such as Sina.com or China
daily.)
In this paper, we use Chinese banks to analyze the borrower
concentration problem for the following four reasons. First, similar
to other countries, China has limits on large exposure, which
means that ﬁndings on China could be applicable to other coun-
tries. Second, China’s banks are required to disclose detailed infor-
mation on their largest ten borrowers, which makes our
investigation feasible. Other countries do not typically require
the disclosure of information on credit concentration.10 Third, the
problem of borrower concentration is severe in China, which facili-
tates obtaining meaningful results. Fourth, the importance of China’s
economy and China’s banking sector suggests that understanding
the behavior of Chinese banks could be of interest to both regulators
and investors around the world.
2.3. Understanding borrower concentration
Traditional arguments (such as Diamond, 1984) suggest that
banks should be as diversiﬁed as possible. Diversiﬁcation across
borrowers has the potential to reduce default risk and the cost of
monitoring borrowers. However, as in our sample, banks often
maintain a high degree of borrower concentration despite regula-
tions on large exposure. To understand the high borrower concen-
tration, we propose two different views based on prior literature.11
The ﬁrst is the monitoring view; that is, banks maintain a high
degree of borrower concentration to maintain close relationships
with a few important borrowers. Banks can obtain more informa-
tion from those borrowers and closely monitor their operations
(Dass and Massa, 2011). The monitoring view is consistent with
ﬁndings in Acharya et al. (2006), who ﬁnd that for high-risk banks,
diversiﬁcation reduces bank returns while producing riskier loans,
while for low-risk banks, diversiﬁcation also produces an inefﬁ-
cient return-risk tradeoff. Acharya et al. (2006) attribute their
results to the deterioration in the effectiveness of bank monitoring
associated with loan diversiﬁcation. Berger et al. (2010) also exam-
ine the effect of loan diversiﬁcation on bank performance. Using
loan portfolio information from Chinese banks, the authors provide
robust evidence that diversiﬁcation is associated with reduced
proﬁt and efﬁciency. Tabak et al. (2011) obtain similar results for
Brazilian banks. Although the diversiﬁcation examined in these
papers is primarily across industries, the basic rationale can be
applied to diversiﬁcation across borrowers.
The second is the tunneling view; that is, a high degree of con-
centration across borrowers is due to a large amount of harmful
related lending. Utilizing a sample of Mexican banks, La Porta
et al. (2003) ﬁnd that on average 20% of the top 300 loans of Mex-
ican banks are made to related borrowers. For larger loans, the per-
centage could be even higher. In a representative case discussed in
the paper,12 the authors ﬁnd that related parties obtained twelve of
the largest twenty loans outstanding. The authors ﬁnd that related
lending has lower interest rates but higher default rates than other
types of loans, suggesting that controlling shareholders use related
lending as a channel to expropriate the interests of minority share-
holders. Laeven (2001) examines the use of related lending in Russia
and reaches similar conclusions. In China, bank ownership is concen-
trated among a few large shareholders. As a developing country, Chi-
na has an underdeveloped legal system and weak investor protection
(Allen et al., 2005), which provides controlling shareholders with
substantial latitude to expropriate minority shareholders. Previous
8 The four largest banks are the Bank of China (BOC), the Agriculture Bank of China
(ABC), the Construction Bank of China (CBC), and the Industrial and Commercial Bank
of China (ICBC). These four banks have more assets and branches than the remaining
banks and are called the ‘‘Big Four’’ (see discussions in Lin and Zhang, 2009).
9 On October 26, 2010, the PBC and the CBRC cancelled the regulation on the limit
to the top 10 borrowers.
10 We have randomly examined ﬁnancial statements for a sample of banks in the
United States, United Kingdom, and Japan, and cannot ﬁnd similar information
disclosed in their ﬁnancial statements.
11 An alternative view is that banks are taking excessive risks. We do not discuss this
view in the text since there is no plausible reason to explain the purpose of this
behavior. Also, our empirical results do not support this view. If the high concen-
tration of borrowers is just high risk, then banks with concentrated borrowers should
have high operating performance, which is against our empirical results.
12 The case discussed is BancoSerﬁn, which is the third largest bank in Mexico.
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studies ﬁnd that the expropriation of minority shareholders by large
shareholders is pervasive in China (Jian and Wong, 2010; Jiang et al.,
2010). Therefore, it is reasonable to conjecture that large sharehold-
ers of commercial banks may divert a large volume of funds to com-
panies that they control, which will lead to a high concentration of
borrowers.
To distinguish between the monitoring view and the tunneling
view, we can examine the association between borrower concentra-
tion and bank performance. If the monitoring view holds, then bor-
rower concentration should be associated with low risk and high
operating performance. Conversely, if the tunneling view dominates,
thenborrower concentrationshouldbeassociatedwithhigh riskand
low operating performance.Moreover, controlling shareholders can
only engage in tunneling behavior when they can dominate the
ﬁrm’s decisionmaking. Therefore, the tunneling viewpredicts a posi-
tive relationship between the level of control exercised by large
shareholders andconcentration.Weempirically examine these rela-
tionships to test which view has more predictive power in China.
3. Sample, variables, and descriptive statistics
3.1. Sample
Our sample is an unbalanced panel including 118 Chinese com-
mercial banks during the period 2006–2011, totaling 366 bank-
year observations.13 We hand collect ﬁnancial and corporate gover-
nance information from the websites of the commercial banks or the
Financial Times (in Chinese), a publicly available data source in
which the CBRC requires banks to disclose relevant information.14
Economic data come from the China Stock Market and Accounting
Research (CSMAR) database. To be included in our sample, a bank
must report required information such as large borrowers, owner-
ship, ﬁnancial performance and other variables.
Table 1 describes the sample distribution across the years under
analysis. There are 46, 61, 53, 61, 74 and 71 observations in 2006,
2007, 2008, 2009, 2010 and 2011, respectively, and the total num-
ber of observations is 366, representing 40.26% of the total popula-
tion of bank-year observations.15 The distribution does not exhibit
severe temporal clustering.
3.2. Variable deﬁnitions
Our main variable of interest is borrower concentration. Chine-
se commercial banks are required by the regulator (i.e., the CBRC)
to disclose their ten largest loans in their annual reports. We utilize
the disclosed information to construct two variables: LC1 is the
loan to the largest borrower, and LC10 represents the loans to
the top 10 borrowers. These two variables are both deﬂated by
the net capital of the bank. We use net capital as our deﬂator
because the CBRC, similar to other regulators, establishes limits
on large loan exposure using net capital. We use the largest related
loans as a percentage of net capital (R1) and the top 10 related
loans as a percentage of net capital (R10) to measure the related
transactions between banks and their related borrowers.
We employ the non-performing loan ratio (NPL) to measure a
bank’s lending quality. A high value of the NPL ratio indicates high
lending risk, or low loan quality. The ratio of impaired loans to
gross loans is a standard proxy for a bank’s asset risk or loan qual-
ity (Choudhry et al., 2010; Iannotta et al., 2007). Tabak et al. (2011)
also use non-performing loans as a proxy for bank risk when inves-
tigating the effects of loan portfolio concentration on the risk faced
by Brazilian banks. We use return on assets (ROA) and operating
income on assets (OROA) to measure banks’ ﬁnancial performance.
The difference between these two measures is that OROA can miti-
gate the bias caused by non-operating items. These two measures
are often used as proxies for banks’ operating performance (see for
example Iannotta et al., 2007; Andres and Vallelado, 2008; Haw
et al., 2010; Choudhry et al., 2010). Together NPL, ROA and OROA
can measure banks’ levels of risk and operating efﬁciency.
Haw et al. (2010) suggest that concentrated ownership is a nec-
essary condition for tunneling behavior on the part of large share-
holders. When the largest shareholder holds controlling ownership
in the bank, it can more effectively affect the bank’s lending deci-
sions for its own beneﬁt. We include the percentage of shares held
by the largest shareholder (FIRST). We also calculate the percent-
age of shares held by the largest shareholder divided by the per-
centage of shares held by the second through tenth shareholders
(HCR). FIRST represents the voting power of the largest sharehold-
er, while HCR compares the relative voting power of the largest
shareholder to that of other block shareholders. If other block
shareholders have more shares or voting rights, they are more like-
ly to constrain the expropriation behavior of the largest sharehold-
er. To mitigate the effects of outliers, we include the binary
versions of these two variables in our regressions16: FD equals 1
if a bank’s FIRST value is above the sample median in that year, 0
otherwise; HCRD equals 1 if a bank’s HCR value is above the sample
median in that year, 0 otherwise. We include STATE to reﬂect
whether a bank’s largest shareholder is the government or a state-
owned enterprise. For detailed variable deﬁnitions, please refer to
Appendix A.
3.3. Descriptive statistics
Table 2 reports some statistics for our sample. The mean (medi-
an) values of LC1 and LC10 are 21.7% (7.5%) and 88.2% (48.9%),
respectively. The evidence suggests that a large proportion of
banks (approximately 50% of observations) have exceeded the lim-
its on large borrower concentration. The maximum of LC1 (LC10) in
our sample is 4.405 (8.930), indicating that the loans to the largest
Table 1
Sample distribution.
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total
Commercial banks in China 130 141 153 160 164 161 909
Sample in this paper 46 61 53 61 74 71 366
Ratio (%) 35.38 43.26 34.64 38.13 45.12 44.10 40.26
Note: This table describes our sample distribution by year and the percentage of Chinese banks included in our sample.
13 Because of the difﬁculty of collecting necessary data, some banks only show in
our sample once (29 banks) or twice (28 banks). To ensure the robustness of our
results, we delete banks that appear only once or twice and reanalyze the data. Our
conclusions do not change.
14 The website is http://www.ﬁnancialnews.com.cn/.
15 Because the majority of banks are not publicly listed, their ﬁnancial information
may not be accessible or may be incomplete for our analyses. However, our sample
includes most large banks and is representative of the banking industry. The total
assets of our sample banks are on average 83.8% of the total assets of the whole
commercial bank population.
16 The use of continuous versions of these two variables does not affect our
conclusions.
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borrower (top 10 borrowers) account for 440.5% (893%) of net capi-
tal, which is much larger than the legal limits. From Table 2, we can
infer that the enforcement of banking regulation has not been
effective.17 However, a more interesting follow-up question is why
banks have such strong incentives to maintain a high degree of bor-
rower concentration. In this study, we examine the economic conse-
quences and determinants of borrower concentration to understand
banks’ incentives to maintain a high degree of concentration.
The mean ROA and OROA values are 0.9% and 1.2%, respectively,
indicating that on average, commercial banks in China earned a
proﬁt during the sample period. The values of these performance
variables are quite similar to those reported in Berger et al.
(2010). The mean (median) of non-performing loans to assets
(NPL) is 1.7% (1.2%), which is slightly lower than that in Berger
et al. (2010). The difference could be due to different sample peri-
ods. The sample period in Berger et al. (2010) is 1996–2006, earlier
than that in our sample.
On average, the largest shareholder owns 23.2% of the total
shares, suggesting that the largest shareholder has signiﬁcant vot-
ing power in banks. The concentration of ownership in commercial
banks is prevalent in the world. Li and Song (2013) report that the
largest shareholder holds an average of 32.04% of total shares
(sample including 255 banks from 48 countries) and Caprio et al.
(2007) report an average of 32.6% (sample including 244 banks
from 44 countries). The mean value of HCR is 0.814, indicating that
the shares held by the largest shareholder equals 81.4% of the total
shares owned by the second through the tenth shareholders. The
mean value of STATE is 0.76, indicating 76% of banks are directly
or indirectly controlled by the government, which is consistent
with the ﬁnding in La Porta et al. (2002) that government owner-
ship of banks is large and pervasive worldwide.
Table 2 also shows that 5.5% of observations are the Big Four
banks, and 19.4% of observations in our sample are listed banks.
The mean (median) of SIZE is 18.107 (17.695), larger than that
reported in Berger et al. (2010). The mean (median) value of LOAN
is 0.512 (0.521), indicating that loans account for 51.2% (52.1%) of
total assets.
4. Primary analysis
4.1. How does borrower concentration affect loan quality and bank
performance?
To distinguish between the monitoring view and the tunneling
view, we estimate a pooled OLS model (Eq. (1)) to be consistent
with previous studies, such as Berger et al. (2010) and Haw et al.
(2010)18:
Loan Risk=Performance ¼ b0 þ b1SIZEþ b2LOAN þ b3FD
þ b4STATEþ b5FORCAP þ b6BIG4
þ b7GDPGrowth
þ b8Borrower Concentration
þ
X
diYear dummiesþ e ð1Þ
Among the dependent variables, we use the NPL to measure the
loan risk. Since the NPL is a censored variable that ranges from 0 to
1, we use the logit transformation of non-performing loans ratio
(TNPL) instead. We use return on assets (ROA) or operating return
on assets (OROA) to measure bank performance. Borrower concen-
tration is the main variable of interest, which we measure using
two proxies, LC1 represents the largest loans as a percentage of
net capital and LC10 the largest ten loans as a percentage of net
capital.
Following Andres and Vallelado (2008) and Haw et al. (2010),
we include the log of total assets (SIZE), loans as a percentage of
total assets (LOAN) in our regression model. According to prior lit-
erature (La Porta et al., 2002; Haw et al., 2010), bank ownership is
an important determinant of bank performance. Therefore, we
include three variables, FD, STATE and FORCAP, to capture the
ownership structure. FD indicates whether the ﬁrst shareholder
has an ownership larger than the sample median; STATE indicates
Table 2
Summary statistics.
Variables #Obs Mean Std Min P25 Median P75 Max
LC1 366 0.217 0.405 0.008 0.047 0.075 0.128 4.405
LC10 330 0.882 1.127 0.060 0.275 0.489 0.876 8.930
NPL 366 0.017 0.017 0 0.008 0.012 0.021 0.146
TNPL 366 4.432 1.203 9.210 4.885 4.398 3.842 1.768
ROA 353 0.009 0.005 0.014 0.007 0.010 0.012 0.029
OROA 361 0.012 0.007 0.016 0.009 0.013 0.015 0.035
FIRST 366 0.232 0.168 0.029 0.117 0.191 0.268 0.900
HCR 347 0.814 2.322 0.113 0.259 0.351 0.612 26.099
STATE 366 0.760 0.428 0 1 1 1 1
FORCAP 366 0.303 0.460 0 0 0 1 1
BIG4 366 0.055 0.228 0 0 0 0 1
SIZE 366 18.107 2.013 14.377 16.655 17.695 19.214 23.463
LOAN 366 0.512 0.099 0.035 0.459 0.521 0.580 0.787
GDPGrowth 366 0.179 0.070 0.051 0.156 0.179 0.206 0.546
LIST 366 0.194 0.396 0 0 0 0 1
SNUM 366 15.564 3.863 9.463 12.767 14.939 16.806 25.341
FNUM 366 9.549 1.046 5.956 8.764 9.555 10.532 11.090
Note: This table presents bank characteristics for our sample. Variable deﬁnitions are shown in Appendix A.
17 The following are possible reasons that some banks may exceed the loan
concentration limit: ﬁrst, China has weak legal enforcement and a loose bank
governance environment (Allen et al., 2005). Although the Commercial Bank Law has
set a clear limit for the loan concentration, it does not specify the corresponding
penalty for the violation; hence, the banking regulator has no effective method to
control banks in violation. For example, in 2009, the largest client of Hankou Bank
borrowed loans equal to 33.28% of the net capital (LC1). The Hankou Bank, however,
received a ﬁne of only 300,000 RMB. Second, the banking regulator has no incentive to
remedy the loan concentration problem. In China, the government plays an important
role in credit resource allocation. When the government intends to pursue higher
economic growth using credit resources, the banking regulator has to cooperate and
loosen the regulation of credit. For example, an ofﬁcial of the Banking Regulatory
Committee pointed out that the 4 trillion stimulus plan of China after the 2008
ﬁnancial crisis signiﬁcantly increased loan concentration (Wang, 2013).
18 We also tried a random effect model and a ﬁxed effect model and our conclusions
are consistent. The results for the ﬁxed effect model are reported in Section 4.4. The
results for random effect model are not reported and are available upon request.
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whether the largest shareholder is the government or a state-
owned enterprise; FOCAP indicates whether a foreign investor is
among the bank’s top 10 shareholders. Berger et al. (2009) ﬁnd that
the big four banks are much larger than other banks and are the
least efﬁcient with respect to operations and cost management.
Therefore, we include the dummy variable BIG4 in model (1). We
also include the gross domestic product growth at the province
level (GDPGrowth). To control for potential biases in standard
errors estimated in the OLS regression, we base our tests on robust
standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and cross sectional
correlations in the residuals (Peterson, 2009).
We report regression results for the full set of bank operating
characteristics in Table 3. In columns 1 and 2, the coefﬁcients of
LC1 and LC10 are 0.688 (signiﬁcant at the 5% level) and 0.344
(signiﬁcant at the 1% level), respectively, suggesting that banks
with higher levels of borrower concentration have higher non-
performing loan ratios. A one standard deviation increase in
LC1 (LC10) increases NPL by 0.48% (0.67%). Given that the sam-
ple mean of NPL is 1.7%, these effects are of clear economic sig-
niﬁcance. In columns 3 and 4, LC1 and LC10 are negatively
correlated with ROA. The coefﬁcients are 0.004 and 0.002,
respectively, and are both signiﬁcant at the 1% level. A one stan-
dard deviation increase in LC1 (LC10) decreases ROA by 0.16%
(0.23%). In columns 5 and 6 using OROA as the dependent vari-
able, LC1 and LC10 have coefﬁcients of 0.005 and 0.002, both
signiﬁcant at the 1% level. A one standard deviation increase in
LC1 (LC10) decreases OROA by 0.20% (0.23%). Given that the
sample mean of ROA (OROA) is 0.9% (1.2%), these effects are of
clear economic signiﬁcance. The results in Table 3 indicate that
a high degree of borrower concentration is signiﬁcantly associat-
ed with high loan risk and low performance, after controlling for
the other variables. The results are consistent with the tunneling
view and contradict with the monitoring view.
Regarding the control variables, SIZE is signiﬁcantly negative in
column3 through column6, suggesting that smaller banks are asso-
ciatedwithbetter performance. LOAN is positive in columns1, 2, 3, 5
and 6, indicating that banks with more loans have higher non-per-
forming loans, but also enjoy higher performance. This is reasonable
because banks in China primarily proﬁt through interest rate
spreads. BIG4 is signiﬁcant in columns 1–6, suggesting that the big
four banks had higher non-performing loans but also earned higher
proﬁts during this period.19 The non-signiﬁcance of GDPGrowth in all
models suggests that there is no obvious difference between the per-
formance of banks in more developed and developing areas.
4.2. The effect of ownership structure on borrower concentration
In this section, we link ownership structure with borrower con-
centration by running a pooled OLS model (Eq. (2)):
Borrower Concentration ¼ b0 þ b1SIZEþ b2LOAN þ b3STATE
þ b4FORCAP þ b5BIG4
þ b6GDPGrowthþ b7Ownership
þ
X
diYear dummiesþ e ð2Þ
The dependent variable is borrower concentration, proxied by
LC1 or LC10 as deﬁned above. Our main variable of interest is own-
ership structure, for which we use two proxies: FD and HCRD. FD
measures the absolute voting rights of the largest shareholder;
the higher the level of ownership, the higher the decision power.
HCRD, however, considers the voting rights of the largest share-
holder relative to other block shareholders. The literature (for
example Jian and Wong, 2010; Jiang et al., 2010) suggests that con-
trolling shareholders engage in tunneling behavior when legal and
market institutions are weak. For large shareholders to tunnel from
Table 3
Borrower concentration, loan risk and performance.
Variables Dependent variables
TNPL ROA OROA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
SIZE 0.001 0.051 0.000* 0.000** 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.02) (0.96) (1.86) (2.23) (2.70) (2.88)
LOAN 1.703* 1.336* 0.006* 0.005 0.016*** 0.017***
(1.97) (1.81) (1.86) (1.33) (4.32) (3.85)
FD 0.237 0.260 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001
(1.47) (1.51) (0.56) (0.20) (0.85) (0.66)
STATE 0.006 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.002* 0.002
(0.04) (0.04) (0.51) (0.65) (1.73) (1.62)
FORCAP 0.104 0.069 0.002** 0.002** 0.003** 0.003**
(0.39) (0.26) (2.51) (2.46) (2.45) (2.30)
BIG4 0.726*** 0.619*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.007*** 0.007***
(3.11) (2.75) (3.74) (3.64) (4.68) (4.59)
GDPGrowth 0.770 0.704 0.008 0.007 0.003 0.002
(1.39) (1.36) (1.38) (1.30) (0.53) (0.40)
LC1 0.688** 0.004*** 0.005***
(2.55) (4.40) (4.46)
LC10 0.344*** 0.002*** 0.002***
(3.62) (4.65) (4.93)
Constant 5.575*** 6.461*** 0.018*** 0.021*** 0.023*** 0.026***
(6.67) (6.77) (4.21) (4.67) (4.68) (4.58)
Year dummies Controlled Controlled Controlled
#Obs 366 330 353 319 361 326
R2 0.30 0.32 0.29 0.30 0.35 0.37
Note: This table presents the results of pooled OLS regressions of loan risk and performance on borrower concentration. The dependent variables are: TNPL, ROA and OROA,
respectively. Variable deﬁnitions are shown in Appendix A. Numbers in parentheses are t statistics, which are based on robust standard errors clustered by bank.
* Statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
** Statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
*** Statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
19 Berger et al. (2009) ﬁnd that the big four banks are less efﬁcient than other banks,
contrary to our results. The reason could be the difference in time periods. Berger
et al. (2009) examine bank performance in an earlier period.
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the bank, they need to dominate its lending decisions. We predict
that the coefﬁcients of FD and HCRDwill be signiﬁcantly positive in
model (2).
To control for other possible factors that may inﬂuence the
determinants of borrower concentration, we also include SIZE,
LOAN, STATE, FORCAP, BIG4 and GDPGrowth as control variables
in model (2). In addition, we include year dummies to control for
time ﬁxed effects.
Table 4 presents the regression results. In columns 1 and 3, the
coefﬁcients of FD are 0.187 and 0.555, respectively (both sig-
niﬁcant at the 1% level). The economic signiﬁcance is also large.
A one standard deviation increase in FD increases LC1 (LC10) by
9.5% (28.2%). The results indicate that when the largest shareholder
has more voting power, borrower concentration is more severe. In
columns 2 and 4, the coefﬁcients of HCRD are also signiﬁcantly
positive, with coefﬁcients of 0.256 and 0.771 (both signiﬁcant at
the 1% level). Compared to ﬁrms with below-median HCR, ﬁrms
with above-median HCR have 25.6% (77.1%) more of LC1 (LC10).
The results indicate that when the voting power of the largest
shareholder relative to other block shareholders is high, borrower
concentration is more severe. Taken together, the results in Table 4
provide further evidence supporting the tunneling view.
Regarding the control variables, the coefﬁcients of SIZE are sig-
niﬁcantly negative at the 1% level in all regressions, which indi-
cates that larger banks have a lower degree of loan
concentration. LOAN is not signiﬁcant in any regression, showing
that banks with more loan assets do not have high levels of bor-
rower concentration. The coefﬁcients of FORCAP are signiﬁcant in
columns 1, 2 and 3, suggesting that foreign investors have a posi-
tive monitoring effect on the distribution of loans.
4.3. Borrower concentration and reported related lending
A high degree of borrower concentration could be the result of a
large volume of related lending. Because banks also disclose related
lending in their annual reports, a natural question to ask is: what is
the relationshipbetween thedisclosed related lendingandborrower
concentration? To answer this question,we further collect disclosed
related lending information from the banks’ annual reports.
Of the 366 bank year observations in our original sample, we
can only collect related lending information for 198 (or 54.10% of
the original sample). In these 198 observations, banks disclosed
related lending to large shareholders and their associates. We use
the related lending information to construct two variables: R1 rep-
resents the share of the largest related loans in net capital; R10
represents the largest ten related loans as a share of net capital.
These variables are constructed analogously to the borrower con-
centration variables.
As reported in Panel A of Table 5, banks in our sample have an
average R1 of 10.3% and R10 of 21.6%. This indicates that the lar-
gest related loans represent 10.3% of net capital and the largest
ten related loans represent 21.6% of net capital. We also calculate
the percentage of related loans in the total loans. The mean value
of the largest (top 10) related loans is 1.15% (2.44%) of total loans.20
We calculate the correlations between measures of borrower
concentration and related lending and present the results in Panel
B of Table 5. The results show that borrower concentration and
related lending are highly correlated, with coefﬁcients ranging
from 0.495 to 0.731. The results support the view that high bor-
rower concentration is a result of a large volume of related lending.
However, compared to the measures of borrower concentration,
the related lending is much smaller (R1 = 10.3% versus LC1 = 21.7%;
R10 = 21.6% versus LC10 = 88.2%). This suggests that many large
loans are not included in related lending disclosures. There are
two possible explanations for this phenomenon: First, some large
borrowers are not related parties; therefore, loans to these borrow-
ers are not included in related lending disclosures. Second, some
borrowers are related parties, but banks have not correctly identi-
ﬁed loans to these parties as related lending. In other words, the
related lending disclosures only present an incomplete picture of
the true situation of related lending. The ﬁrst possibility seems
undeniably true; however, we argue that the second possibility is
also true, a point elaborated below.
Banks may not correctly identify and report all related lending
for a few reasons. First, many banks in China only identify loans
related to the largest ten shareholders as related lending, which
will underestimate total loans to related parties. Therefore, a few
large borrowers are not identiﬁed as related parties. Second, as a
transitional country, many commercial banks of China are con-
trolled by the government. The government simultaneously oper-
ates numerous enterprises through different departments. The
government can divert funds to the enterprises it controls, but
according to regulations, does not need to report these loans as
related lending. Third, there is a broad consensus that large bank
shareholders divert resources to their ﬁrms through related lend-
ing in developing countries. For example, La Porta et al. (2003) ﬁnd
that related lending results in reduced loan collateral ratios, inter-
est rates, and performance and higher non-performing loss. Cull
et al. (2006) suggest that related lending is a serious enough con-
cern to compel governments to monitor it. The regulator, the CBRC,
has established strict supervision rules on related lending to con-
trol for potential ﬁnancial risk.21 Therefore, banks may intentionally
avoid reporting loans as related lending.
Table 4
Determinants of borrower concentration.
Variables Dependent variables
LC1 LC10
(1) (2) (3) (4)
SIZE 0.038*** 0.063*** 0.179*** 0.261***
(2.92) (3.88) (4.63) (5.58)
LOAN 0.244 0.279 0.241 0.422
(1.37) (1.45) (0.28) (0.50)
STATE 0.031 0.043 0.100 0.129
(0.79) (0.96) (0.71) (0.82)
FORCAP 0.117** 0.117** 0.313** 0.252
(2.38) (2.08) (2.17) (1.55)
BIG4 0.002 0.088 0.141 0.385**
(0.04) (1.35) (0.84) (2.00)
GDPGrowth 0.504 0.640 1.014 1.528*
(1.35) (1.61) (1.20) (1.74)
FD 0.187*** 0.555***
(3.26) (3.67)
HCRD 0.256*** 0.771***
(3.62) (4.33)
Constant 0.479** 0.859*** 3.179*** 4.396***
(2.01) (3.11) (3.50) (4.06)
Year dummies Controlled Controlled
#Obs 366 347 330 311
R2 0.28 0.32 0.37 0.42
Note: This table presents the results of pooled OLS regressions of borrower con-
centration on ownership variables. The dependent variables are: LC1 and LC10.
Variable deﬁnitions are shown in Appendix A. Numbers in parentheses are t
statistics, which are based on robust standard errors clustered by bank.
* Statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
** Statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
*** Statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
20 Compared to ﬁndings in La Porta et al. (2003), related loans in Chinese
commercial banks seem lower. La Porta et al. (2003) ﬁnd that among the top 300
largest loans of Mexican banks, 20% are made to related borrowers.
21 Regulations issued by the CBRC allow credit line commercial banks to provide
loans to related parties in the amount of less than 10% of their net capital. Our
ﬁndings suggest that, on average, Chinese commercial banks provide related lending
exceeding this limit.
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To provide evidence supporting the above arguments, we
include the case of Guilin Bank in Appendix B. The Appendix
shows that the largest shareholder of Guilin Bank is the Guilin
Bureau of Finance, a department of the Guilin government. There
are no disclosed large loans related to the largest shareholder.
However, an examination of the top borrowers ﬁnds that the
three largest borrowers are all controlled by the local govern-
ment. Overall, these three borrowers borrowed a total of 519.4
million in loans, or 114.58% of net capital, which leads to a high
level of borrower concentration that exceeds the regulatory lim-
it. This case clearly illustrates that some of banks’ largest bor-
rowers are related parties but are not correctly identiﬁed as
such and loans to these parties are not disclosed as related lend-
ing. Therefore, the high level of borrower concentration could be
used as an indicator of a large amount of related lending. This
indicator could more appropriately reﬂect the true situation of
related lending (or tunneling) than the disclosed information
on related lending.
The foregoing arguments are based on a case study. To validate
the arguments we require some large sample evidence. Ideally, if
we can identify whether each of the large borrowers is actually a
related party of large shareholders, then we can calculate the true
amount of related lending and provide direct evidence. However,
the relationship between large borrowers and large shareholders
cannot be observed directly.
We provide some indirect evidence. If related lending is driving
the relation between loan concentration and performance, and
banks correctly identify all related loans, then the disclosed related
loans should absorb all of the explanatory power of borrower con-
centration with respect to loan risk and bank performance. There-
fore, in Table 5 Panel C, we compare the explanatory power of
borrower concentration and related lending with respect to loan
risk and bank performance. After controlling for related lending,
we ﬁnd that the effects of the borrower concentration measures
do not change. The LC10 estimates are positively related to loan
risk and negatively related to bank performance, with signiﬁcance
levels of 0.01. A one standard deviation increase in LC10 increases
NPL by 0.74%, and decreases ROA(OROA) by 0.23% (0.23%). Con-
versely, the effects of related lending are not stable. When R10 is
included in the regression without including LC10, R10 is not sig-
niﬁcantly related to non-performing loans and is signiﬁcantly
negatively related to bank performance. However, when LC10 is
included, the relationship between R10 and non-performing loans
becomes signiﬁcantly negative (coefﬁcient = 0.231 and t-
stat = 2.09). Additionally, the relationships between R10 and
bank performance decline in signiﬁcance. Overall, the evidence
Table 5
Relationship between related lending and borrower concentration.
Variables #Obs Mean Std Min P25 Median P75 Max
Panel A: summary statistics
R1 198 0.103 0.229 0 0.012 0.046 0.091 2.318
R10 198 0.216 0.381 0 0.032 0.098 0.239 3.130
LC1 366 0.217 0.405 0.008 0.047 0.075 0.128 4.405
LC10 330 0.882 1.127 0.060 0.275 0.489 0.876 8.930
R1 R10 LC1
Panel B: correlation
R10 0.895***
LC1 0.731*** 0.647***
LC10 0.547*** 0.495*** 0.891***
Variables Dependent variables
TNPL ROA OROA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel C: ownership, related loan and loan concentration on loan risk and performance
SIZE 0.078* 0.008 0.001** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(1.78) (0.20) (2.07) (3.00) (3.03) (3.71)
LOAN 1.585 1.777* 0.008 0.008 0.020*** 0.022***
(1.12) (1.77) (1.55) (1.63) (2.83) (3.49)
FD 0.012 0.112 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000
(0.06) (0.67) (1.31) (0.49) (0.98) (0.21)
STATE 0.064 0.077 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.002
(0.36) (0.49) (0.11) (0.27) (1.16) (1.29)
FORCAP 0.274 0.396** 0.001 0.002** 0.001 0.002
(1.37) (2.04) (1.39) (2.01) (1.06) (1.63)
GDPGrowth 0.261 0.489 0.009** 0.008 0.010 0.007
(0.28) (0.66) (2.01) (1.67) (1.45) (1.15)
R10 0.058 0.231** 0.003*** 0.002* 0.005*** 0.003***
(0.42) (2.09) (3.02) (1.72) (4.19) (2.94)
LC10 0.379*** 0.002*** 0.002***
(5.29) (3.26) (3.61)
Constant 4.288*** 5.853*** 0.021*** 0.025*** 0.032*** 0.038***
(3.99) (6.52) (3.43) (4.34) (3.65) (4.38)
Year dummies Controlled Controlled Controlled
#Obs 198 182 195 180 196 181
R2 0.28 0.37 0.24 0.34 0.34 0.43
Note: Panel A summarizes related lending and borrower concentration. Panel B presents the correlation between related lending and borrower concentration. Panel C presents
the results of pooled OLS regressions of loan risk and performance on borrower concentration and related loans. The dependent variables are: TNPL, ROA, and OROA,
respectively. Variable deﬁnitions are shown in Appendix A. Numbers in parentheses are t statistics, which are based on robust standard errors clustered by bank.
* Statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
** Statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
*** Statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
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Table 6
Controlling for endogeneity problem.
Variables Dependent variables
LC1 LC10
(1) (2)
Panel A: ﬁrst stage regression
SNUM 0.014** 0.035*
(2.02) (1.90)
FNUM 0.074*** 0.284***
(3.84) (5.47)
SIZE 0.060*** 0.240***
(3.69) (5.62)
LOAN 0.373* 0.878
(1.77) (1.40)
FD 0.182*** 0.522***
(4.82) (5.17)
STATE 0.000 0.023
(0.00) (0.19)
BIG4 0.056 0.063
(0.55) (0.24)
FORCAP 0.111** 0.261**
(2.29) (2.03)
GDPGrowth 0.270 0.195
(0.78) (0.22)
Constant 1.375*** 6.387***
(3.82) (6.67)
Year dummies Controlled Controlled
#Obs 366 330
R2 0.32 0.43
Variables Dependent variables
TNPL ROA OROA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel B: IV regression
SIZE 0.010 0.056 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001**
(0.24) (1.15) (1.05) (1.53) (1.51) (1.99)
LOAN 1.821** 1.722** 0.004 0.002 0.013*** 0.013***
(2.20) (2.57) (1.11) (0.57) (2.82) (2.65)
FD 0.433** 0.371** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(2.33) (2.15) (0.35) (0.49) (0.26) (0.31)
STATE 0.028 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.002* 0.002*
(0.20) (0.02) (0.44) (0.65) (1.70) (1.65)
BIG4 0.834*** 0.703*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.005*** 0.006***
(3.73) (3.17) (3.03) (3.05) (3.77) (3.85)
FORCAP 0.272 0.179 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.004***
(0.91) (0.61) (2.80) (2.59) (2.96) (2.68)
GDPGrowth 1.510** 1.115** 0.004 0.005 0.002 0.002
(2.50) (2.54) (0.74) (0.90) (0.48) (0.36)
LC1 1.729** 0.007* 0.010**
(2.17) (1.65) (1.99)
LC10 0.540** 0.003** 0.004***
(2.39) (2.06) (2.58)
Constant 5.517*** 6.489*** 0.015*** 0.020*** 0.018*** 0.024***
(6.27) (6.60) (3.00) (3.35) (3.03) (3.11)
Year dummies Controlled Controlled Controlled
Sargan test 0.57 0.90 0.06 0.003 0.18 0.07
(p value) (0.452) (0.344) (0.808) (0.960) (0.668) (0.797)
Stock and Yogo test 10.17 17.87 9.35 16.73 10.06 17.78
#Obs 366 330 353 319 361 326
R2 0.16 0.27 0.17 0.22 0.21 0.26
Variables Dependent variable
TNPL ROA OROA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel C: panel data ﬁxedeffects model
SIZE 0.631 0.858 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.001
(1.30) (1.59) (0.03) (0.75) (0.35) (0.48)
LOAN 1.353 1.508 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.005
(1.19) (1.36) (0.12) (0.09) (0.33) (0.73)
FD 0.125 0.128 0.002* 0.002** 0.002* 0.002**
(0.83) (0.78) (1.91) (2.40) (1.86) (2.18)
216 P. Rao et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 54 (2015) 208–221
suggests that compared to related lending, borrower concentration
provides additional information to explain loan quality and bank
performance. The evidence is consistent with the arguments that
the related lending disclosures are not complete and borrower con-
centration acts as a useful indicator of large shareholder tunneling
through related lending.
4.4. Controlling for endogeneity issues
Endogeneity issues may arise because certain omitted variables
drive both borrower concentration and ﬁrm performance. We use
several different methods to address concerns regarding
endogeneity.
First, we use a 2SLS model with instrumental variables. In the
ﬁrst stage model, we regress borrower concentration on instru-
mental variables and other control variables. We choose two
instrumental variables. The ﬁrst is FNUM, which is the log of the
number of manufacturing ﬁrms with sales exceeding ﬁve million
yuan (approximately $800,000) in the province in which the bank
is located. This information is obtained from the annual survey of
the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). When a province has fewer
large enterprises, banks in the province have fewer potential bor-
rowers; therefore, we expect banks in that province to have high
levels of borrower concentration. The second variable is SNUM,
which is the average number of employees per bank unit at the
province level. In a province where bank employees are concen-
trated in a few branches, the bank has less chances accessing to
the population of potential borrowers, therefore the bank is more
likely to have a high level of borrower concentration.22
In Panel A of Table 6, we report the results of the ﬁrst stage
regression, where we regress borrower concentration on the above
two instrumental variables and other control variables. The instru-
mental variables are signiﬁcant as predicted. FNUM is signiﬁcantly
negative, suggesting that the more large enterprises there are in
the province, the lower the degree of borrower concentration.
SNUM is signiﬁcantly positive, suggesting that in regions where
each bank unit has more employees the borrower concentration
is high. We also report Stock and Yogo (2005) tests for the weak
instrument problems in Panel B of Table 6. The relevant F-statistics
for the ﬁrst-stage regressions range from 9.35 to 17.87, suggesting
that our instruments are generally acceptable.23
In Panel B of Table 6, we report the results of the second stage
regression, where we use the estimated borrower concentration
from the ﬁrst stage regression as our independent variable to
replace actual borrower concentration. As we can see, the results
are qualitatively similar to the previous results, indicating that bor-
rower concentration is positively related with risk and negatively
related with performance. An advantage of having two instrumen-
tal variables (IVs) and only one endogenous regressor is that we
can conduct an over-identiﬁcation test of whether the IVs satisfy
the exclusion restriction. In Panel B of Table 6, we show the p-val-
ues for the Sargan Test on the over-identifying restrictions in the
second stage. In all cases, we fail to reject these restrictions, with
p-values ranging from 0.344 to 0.960. These results indicate that
our instruments are exogenous. The results suggest that control-
ling for endogeneity does not change our results.
Another common method to address endogeneity concerns is to
use a bank ﬁxed effects model. We present the results of the bank
ﬁxed effects model in Panel C of Table 6. The results are qualita-
tively unchanged.
We also examine a modiﬁed version of our model, in which we
regress the change in performance or the change in risk on the
change in borrower concentration and other control variables.
We also ﬁnd evidence consistent with our conclusions.24
In summary, we use various methods to address the endogene-
ity issue, all of which produce consistent results.
Table 6 (continued)
Variables Dependent variable
TNPL ROA OROA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
STATE 0.335*** 0.363*** 0.002** 0.001 0.000 0.000
(3.07) (3.03) (2.29) (1.54) (0.50) (0.02)
FORCAP 0.244 0.203 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001
(1.38) (1.20) (0.73) (0.35) (0.22) (1.04)
GDPGrowth 0.181 0.265 0.005 0.005 0.001 0.001
(0.35) (0.50) (0.75) (0.70) (0.11) (0.28)
LC1 0.294** 0.002*** 0.004***
(2.24) (3.45) (3.07)
LC10 0.128** 0.001*** 0.002***
(2.17) (2.81) (3.46)
Constant 17.231* 21.677** 0.013 0.019 0.032 0.013
(1.80) (2.04) (0.30) (0.45) (0.58) (0.24)
Bank ﬁxed effects Controlled Controlled Controlled
Year dummies Controlled Controlled Controlled
#Obs 366 330 353 319 361 326
Within R2 0.59 0.60 0.37 0.38 0.38 0.41
Note: Panel A presents the results of the ﬁrst stage regression of the 2SLS model with instruments. We ran pooled OLS regression of borrower concentration on two
instrumental variables and other control variables. The dependent variables are: LC1 and LC10. The instrumental variables are: SNUM and FNUM. Panel B presents the second-
stage of regression, where LC1 and LC10 are estimated from the ﬁrst stage regression. The dependent variables are: TNPL, ROA, and OROA. Panel C presents the results of bank
ﬁxed-effects regressions of loan risk and performance on borrower concentration. The dependent variables are: TNPL, ROA, and OROA, respectively. Variable deﬁnitions are
shown in Appendix A. Numbers in parentheses are t statistics, which are based on robust standard errors clustered by bank.
* Statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
** Statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
*** Statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
22 To ensure that these two variables can effectively serve as instrumental variables,
we examine whether the error terms from columns 1–6 of Table 3 are correlated with
our instrument variables. We ﬁnd that the correlations between error terms and our
instrumental variables are small and insigniﬁcant.
23 Stock and Yogo (2005) suggests that for the critical values at 15% and 20%
signiﬁcance level for n = 1 (one endogenous variable) and K2 = 2 (two instruments) is
11.59 and 8.75, respectively.
24 For brevity we do not report these results, which are available upon request.
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5. Further analyses
5.1. Ownership types of large borrowers
Although we cannot obtain detailed information on large bor-
rowers, the information provided in the ﬁnancial statements
allows us to identify the ownership types of large borrowers. We
group large borrowers into three categories according to owner-
ship type: the government and its departments, state-owned com-
panies, and non-state-owned companies. The ﬁrst group of
borrowers includes all levels of government, government ﬁnancing
platforms, and government funded public institutions. These bor-
rowers do not operate for proﬁt. The second group of borrowers
includes enterprises that are controlled by the government. The
third group of borrowers includes private or foreign enterprises.
We calculate for each bank the distribution of the largest ten loans
across these three categories of borrowers.
Table 7 presents the results. In the left-hand part of Table 7, we
divide the sample into two groups according to whether FD equals
0 or 1. For the loans to Government and its departments and the
loans to state-owned enterprises, we do not ﬁnd signiﬁcant differ-
ence between these two groups. For the loans to non-state-owned
enterprises, there is marginal signiﬁcance between these two
groups. In the right-hand part of Table 7, we further divide banks
for which FD equals 1 into two sub-groups: banks with state-
owned controlling shareholders and banks with non-state-owned
controlling shareholders. The distribution of large loans between
these groups differs signiﬁcantly. For banks with state-owned con-
trolling shareholders, 13.3% of large loans go to the government
and its departments, 32.6% go to state-owned enterprises, and
the remaining 54.1% go to non-state-owned enterprises. Converse-
ly, for banks with non-state-owned controlling shareholders, only
3.6% of large loans go to the government and its departments,
18.5% go to state-owned enterprises and the remaining 77.9% go
to non-state-owned enterprises. The differences in the distribu-
tions are all signiﬁcant. The evidence is consistent with the tunnel-
ing view. Banks with non-state-owned controlling shareholders
tend to provide loans to non-state-owned enterprises, while banks
with state-owned controlling shareholders tend to provide loans to
governments or state-owned enterprises. The ownership type of
controlling shareholders matches the ownership types of large
borrowers.
It may be argued that the evidence regarding the ownership
types of controlling shareholders and large borrowers is not direct
evidence of tunneling. In China, credit is often regarded as a scarce
good and is rationed. Therefore, if a private enterprise obtains con-
trol over a local commercial bank, it will likely use its own decision
rights to direct a larger proportion of the rationed loans to itself or
its related parties. Some may argue that this related lending could
be beneﬁcial to social welfare.25 However, we argue that one should
approach this issue from the perspective of the minority sharehold-
ers. Previous results suggest that this related lending is associated
with high risk and low performance, and hence is clearly detrimental
to bank value and clearly expropriates minority shareholders.
Similar arguments apply if the controlling shareholder is the
state. Li and Zhou (2005) ﬁnd that competition over regional GDP
growth is of crucial importance for local government ofﬁcials in
China. Therefore, state shareholders, often controlled by the local
government, have a strong incentive to offer a high volume of loans
to government departments or state owned enterprises (for exam-
ple, all types of city development corporations), which could help
to accomplish their political objectives. These loans typically bear
low interest rates and high risk. This is consistent with Halling
et al. (2010), who ﬁnd that banks controlled by Austrianmunicipali-
ties use their loans for political purposes at the expense of operating
performance. From the perspective of minority shareholders, this
lending represents a tunneling of funds away from the bank at the
expense ofminority shareholder interests. La Porta et al. (2002) ﬁnd
that when the level of government ownership in commercial banks
is high, the banking system cannot effectively allocate capital
because the governmentwill divert funds to entities that can accom-
plish its political purposes. Bailey et al. (2012) also ﬁnd that state-
controlled banks in China often provide loans to ﬁrms with poor
ﬁnancial performance.Ourﬁndingsprovidebank level evidence that
when the controlling shareholder is state-owned, the bank is more
likely to divert loans to companies related to the state.
5.2. The governance effect of going public on borrower concentration
The literature on tunneling suggests that improved corporate
governance or institutional development will constrain the tunnel-
ing behavior of large shareholders (see for example, Jiang et al.,
2010). Among the variety of governance factors, going public on
the stock market is an effective one (Jiang et al., 2009). The stock
market can provide meaningful protection for minority investors
protections through stricter regulations and market mechanisms.
Jiang et al. (2009), for example, demonstrate that the performance
of ﬁrms that have been privatized through an issue of shares (SIP,
share issue privatization) is higher than that of matched non-SIP
SOEs, and the authors attribute this to improved market institu-
tions. In this section, we investigate whether going public con-
strains tunneling behavior by the largest shareholders, using
borrower concentration as an indicator.
At the end of 2011, 16 Chinese commercial banks underwent
the IPO process and were listed on the Shanghai or Shenzhen stock
Table 7
Ownership types of borrowers and ownership types of controlling shareholder.
FD = 0 FD = 1 Diff FD = 1 & STATE = 0 FD = 1 & STATE = 1 Diff
(t-stat) (t-stat)
Government and its departments 0.137 0.113 0.024 0.036 0.133 0.097
(1.29) (3.50)***
State-owned enterprises 0.352 0.297 0.055 0.185 0.326 0.141
(1.57) (2.43)**
Non-state-owned enterprises 0.511 0.590 0.079 0.779 0.541 0.238
(1.81)* (3.28)***
Note: This table examines whether ownership types of controlling shareholders affects the ownership types of large borrowers. We deﬁne three types of ownership types:
government and its departments, state-owned enterprises, and non-state-owned enterprises. Variable deﬁnitions are shown in Appendix A.
* Statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
** Statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
*** Statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
25 Ayyagari et al. (2010) ﬁnd that ﬁrms in China with bank ﬁnancing have higher
growth rates.
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exchange. We expect that public shareholders will devote greater
attention to the banks’ governance and will monitor borrower con-
centration. In addition, listed commercial banks are dually regulat-
ed by the China Security Regulation Committee (CSRC) and the
CBRC and are characterized by greater information transparency
than non-listed commercial banks, which will constrain the tun-
neling behavior of large shareholders.
We run a pooled OLS model (Eq. (3)) to investigate whether
banks being listed can constrain the largest shareholder’s tunnel-
ing behavior through borrower concentration.
Borrower Concentration ¼ b0 þ b1SIZEþ b2LOAN þ b3STATE
þ b4FORCAP þ b5BIG4
þ b6GDPGrowthþ b7LIST
þ b8Ownership
þ b9LISTOwnership
þ
X
diYear dummiesþ e ð3Þ
We add LIST, a dummy variable for banks’ listing status, and an
interactionvariableLIST⁄Ownership.Themainvariableof interesthere
is the interaction term,whichwe expect to be negative, as being listed
on the stockmarket shouldconstrain controlling shareholders’ tunnel-
ing behavior through related lending, thereby reducing the relation-
ship between ownership structure and borrower concentration. The
other control variables are identical to those in previous analyses.
Table 8 presents the regression results. In columns 1 and 3, the
ownership structure variable is FD. In columns 2 and 4, the owner-
ship structure variable is HCRD. The results clearly show that the
interactions between the ownership structure variables and the
LIST dummy are signiﬁcantly negative, consistent with the above
arguments. The performance of the other control variables is quite
similar to those reported in Table 4.26
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate credit borrower concentration
using a sample of Chinese banks. Although China’s banking regula-
tor has established a limit regarding borrower concentration, we
ﬁnd that many banks maintain a high degree of borrower concen-
tration, well above regulatory limits.
To understand banks’ incentives to maintain a high degree of
borrower concentration, we examine empirically the relationship
between borrower concentration and loan quality or bank perfor-
mance. We ﬁnd strong evidence that borrower concentration is
positively related to non-performing loans and negatively related
to ROA or OROA. The evidence is consistent with the tunneling view
that large shareholders divert resources from banks by lending to
related parties, which leads to a high degree of borrower concen-
tration. A large volume of related loans will yield lower loan qual-
ity and poorer bank performance. Additionally, we ﬁnd that when
the largest shareholder has control over voting and other block
shareholders lack sufﬁcient power to constrain the largest share-
holder, the level of borrower concentration is higher. This evidence
is also consistent with the tunneling view. Our results still hold after
we explicitly address endogeneity concerns.
When we compare borrower concentration and disclosed relat-
ed lending information, we ﬁnd that the level of disclosed related
lending is much smaller. Further investigation reveals that many
large borrowers are not identiﬁed as related despite having close
relationships with large shareholders. Therefore, borrower concen-
tration could serve as an indicator of the true level of tunneling.
Consistent with this argument, we ﬁnd that compared to related
lending, borrower concentration has a more stable and signiﬁcant
relationship with loan quality and bank performance.
Our further analyses provide a detailed analysis of the owner-
ship types of large borrowers. We ﬁnd that the ownership types
of controlling shareholders are related to the ownership types of
large borrowers. We also ﬁnd that going public on the stock market
is an effective mechanism to constrain tunneling by large share-
holders through related lending.
Overall, our paper provides a thorough analysis of borrower con-
centration in China. Its results suggest that borrower concentration
could be the result of related lending, which serves as a warning to
regulators that high levels of borrower concentration may not only
be a sign of ﬁnancial risk but also indicate the existence of expro-
priation by large shareholders through related lending.
As a caveat, our empirical results are only based on a sample of Chi-
nese banks andmay not apply to other countries. The lack of borrower
concentration information for the U.S. and international banks makes
it impossible tomake comparisons betweenChinesebanks andothers.
However, theﬁnding in LaPorta et al. (2003) that largeborrowers from
Mexican banks are often related parties is consistent with our investi-
gation, suggesting that the situation in China may not be unique.
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Appendix A. Variable deﬁnition
Variable Deﬁnition
LC1 The ratio of loans of the largest client to bank net
capital
LC10 The ratio of loans of top 10 clients to bank net
capital
NPL Non-performing loan ratio
TNPL Logit transformation of NPL, TNPL = log(NPL/
(1  NPL))
ROA Return on assets (net earnings to total assets)
OROA Operating return on assets (operating earnings to
total assets)
FIRST The percentage of shares held by the largest
shareholder
FD Dummy variable for FIRST, deﬁned as 1 if the
value of FIRST exceeds the sample median value
of FIRST, and 0 otherwise
HCR The percentage of shares held by the largest
shareholder to the percentage of shares held by
the second through the tenth shareholders
HCRD Dummy variable for HCR, deﬁned as 1 if the
value of HCR exceeds the sample median value of
HCR, and 0 otherwise
STATE Dummy variable for state ownership, deﬁned as
1 if bank’s largest shareholder is the government
or a state-owned enterprise, and 0 otherwise
FORCAP Dummy variable, deﬁned as 1 if one of top 10
shareholders of the bank is foreign investor, and
0 otherwise
BIG4 Dummy variable, deﬁned as 1 if the bank is one
of: Industrial and Commercial Bank of China,
China Construction Bank, The Agricultural Bank
of China, or Bank of China, and 0 otherwise
SIZE Logarithm of bank assets
LOAN Ratio of loans to assets; SIZE is logarithm of bank
assets
GDPGrowth The gross domestic product growth at the
province level
R1 The largest related loans as a percentage of net
capital
R10 The largest ten related loans as a percentage of
net capital
LIST Dummy variable, deﬁned as 1 if the bank is a
public bank, and 0 otherwise
SNUM The average number of employees in one bank
operating unit in the province where the bank is
located
FNUM The log of the number of manufacturing ﬁrms
with sales exceeding ﬁve million yuan
(approximately $800,000) in the province in
which the bank is located
Appendix B. A case of Guilin Bank
The Guilin Bank was established in 1997. We obtain the rele-
vant information from its annual reports in 2007.
Panel A shows theownership structureofGuilin Bankand related
loans to the top 10 shareholders in 2007. The largest shareholder is
the Guilin Bureau of Finance, a department of the Guilin govern-
ment. The largest shareholder has 15.37% of the total shares. The
annual reports disclose related loans to the largest ten shareholders.
As shown in the table, 125 million RMB of loans are classiﬁed as
related loans. There are no related loans to the largest shareholder.
Panel B presents loans to the top10borrowers ofGuilin Bank. The
largest 10 borrowers have borrowed 246.42% of the net capital,
which is above the regulated limit by a large amount. Comparing
Panel A and Panel B, we see none of the largest loans are classiﬁed
as related lending.However, detailed investigation suggests another
story. The three largest borrowers (i.e. Guilin Land Reserve Transac-
tion Management Center (GLRTMC), Guilin Economic Construction
Investment Company (GECIC)), and Guilin National Asset Invest-
ment Management Co (GNAIMC) have total loans of 519.4 million
RMB(or114.58%ofnet capital, or 14.56%ofGuilinBank’s total loans),
are actually closely related to the largest shareholder. GLRTMC,
althoughhas an independent legal person status, is attached toGuil-
in Bureau of Land and Resource, a department of Guilin government.
GECIC is founded by the Guilin government for state-owned opera-
tions and infrastructure construction. It is completely controlled by
theGuilin State-ownedAssets Supervision andAdministrativeCom-
mission, another department of Guilin government. GNAIMC is
directly owned by the Guilin Government. These three largest bor-
rowers have close relation to the largest shareholder. However, their
loans are not classiﬁed as related lending.
This case illustrates the issue that some large borrowers,
although seem unrelated, are actually related to large shareholders.
Name of shareholders Ownership
at the end
of 2007 (in
1000
shares)
Ownership
ratio (%)
Lending
(in 1000
RBM)
Panel A: ownership structure and related lending of Guilin Bank in
2007
Guilin Bureau of Finance 61,472 15.37 0
Guilin Aoqun Color Print
Co.
36,000 9 0
Guilin Anxia Real Estate
Development Co.
20,100 5.02 40,000
Liuzhou Zhengling Group 20,000 5 10,000
GuilinXinjin Industrial Co. 19,600 4.9 19,700
Guilin Guilian
Agricultural
Equipment Co.
19,000 4.75 55,800
Guangxi Yuanchen
Investment Group
19,000 4.75 0
Guangxi Electric Power
Development Co.
18,000 4.5 0
Guilin Laiyin
Biotechnology Co.
16,000 4 0
Guilin Tourism
Development Co.
15,000 3.75 0
Total 244,171 61.04 125,000
Name of borrowers Loan (in
1000 RBM)
As % of net
capital
As % of
total
loan
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Appendix B (continued)
Name of shareholders Ownership
at the end
of 2007 (in
1000
shares)
Ownership
ratio (%)
Lending
(in 1000
RBM)
Panel B: top 10 borrowers of Guilin Bank in 2007
Guilin Land Reserve
Transaction
Management Center
233,000 51.40 6.53
Guilin Economic
Construction
Investment Co.
178,800 39.44 5.01
Guilin National Asset
Investment
Management Co.
107,630 23.74 3.02
Guilin Deye Real Estate
Development Co.
96,600 21.31 2.71
Guilin Hongrui
Technology
Development Co.
90,000 19.85 2.52
Guilin Tianxing
Hydropower
Development Co.
90,000 19.85 2.52
Guilin High and New
Technology Industrial
Development Co.
90,000 19.85 2.52
Guilin Guangyun
Industrial Investment
Co.
80,000 17.65 2.24
Guilin Jingang Real Estate
Development Co.
76,000 16.77 2.13
Guilin Hongrui Real
Estate Development
Co.
75,000 16.55 2.10
Total 1117,030 246.42 31.32
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